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of basic logical validity may not involve the illative sense, and Aristotle saw
no need to invoke any such faculty for premises he deemed self-evident or
evident to the senses. But after the modern turn that McInerny laments at
length in Part I, it now takes (at least for some) a conscious decision to trust
those claims of common sense that earlier philosophers might take for
granted. Wherever the will enters in, practical judgment comes into play
about when and where and how enthusiastically to give one's assent.
McInerny closes with a rousing endorsement and defense of John Paul
II's attitude toward faith and reason, presented in the papal encyclical Fides
et Ratio. This approach insists both on the autonomy of philosophy in relying on reason for its conclusions and assessments, and on an attitude of
openness to truth that is beyond human reason (and may in fact be reason's
ultimate fulfillment). It is autonomy but not self-sufficiency that philosophy needs in order to flourish. As for the brand of modern philosophy
that deliberately closes off the path from reason to faith, McInerny calls this
"lapsed Christian philosophy" and its adherents "theologians manques."
The atheological presuppositions that would preclude all discussion of God
thus instantiate the very philosophical bigotry of which they so often
accuse believing philosophers.
Worse still, mistrust of the Creator has led to a mistrust of the creature
as well, so that it is up to believers to defend the capacity of the human
mind to know the truth. In Fides et Ratio and in McInerny'S book as well,
Christianity emerges as the philosopher's best friend. For a spirited, intelligent, and deftly-written defense of these and other "preambles to the preambles" of faith, this book is an excellent place to begin.

Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought by John Lippitt. Macmillan
Press/St Martin's Press, 2000. xii and 210 pp. Cloth. $65.00
Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, edited by D.Z. Phillips and T. Tessin.
Macmillan Press/St Martin's Press, 2000. xxi and 303 pp. Cloth. $65.00
ANTHONY RUDD, St Olaf College
A well-established popular conception of Kierkegaard has it that he is a
fideistic irrationalist, and that the dominant tone of his writings is one of
melancholy and gloom. These perceptions are vigorously challenged in
these two volumes.
As he admits in the first sentence ("Kierkegaard and humour? But isn't
he so gloomy?") Lippitt's title is liable to surprise those who have acquired
the simple image of Kierkegaard as "the melancholy Dane." Yet, as is
apparent to readers of at any rate his pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard
is, for all the undoubted bleakness of some of his writing, probably the
most humourous of all major philosophical authors. Wit, satire and comedy are pervasive features of many of his works, and (moving from use to
mention) he is as interested in analyzing the existential significance of
irony and humour as he is in anxiety, guilt or despair. Commentators have,
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though, shown far less interest in the former themes than the latter. This is
not a minor omission, for as Lippitt convincingly demonstrates,
Kierkegaard's understanding of the comic is inextricably entwined with
his account of ethical and religious existence.
Lippitt's book has a scope that is both narrower and broader than the
title might suggest. It does not attempt to discuss all of either the manifestations or the discussions of the comic in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, confining
itself largely (though not exclusively) to the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript. But Lippitt's account of the comic in the Postscript leads him to
substantial discussions of indirect communication, the significance of
Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, moral perfectionism, Socratic irony, imaginatiar" the nature of the transitions between different existence spheres and
the nature of philosophy itself. It is thus well worth the attention of anyone
with an interest in Kierkegaard or, indeed, in the broader question of the
significance that the comic might have for "serious" questions about the
nature of ethical and religious existence.
The book's argument develops in a somewhat complex fashion. Lippitt
starts by considering the way in which Climacus (the pseudonymous
author of Postscript) uses satire and ridicule as much as argument in his
polemic against Hegel. This raises fundamental questions about the nature
of that polemic and, beyond that, about the nature of philosophy itself. The
Postscript's objection to Hegel is not simply that he commits intellectual
errors, but that there is something fundamentally perverse in his aspiration
to System-building, or in his attempt to include such existential matters as
ethics and religion in his System. And this perversity is not something that
is addressed by demonstrations of the inadequacy of specific arguments or
by simply making Hegel a target of our ridicule; it is, rather, by shocking
us into seeing in ourselves tendencies similar to Hegel's. Climacus' satire,
then, is not an abandonment of proper standards of philosophical rationality, but an attempt to address philosophical confusions at their deepest
level, as confusions of sensibility.
Lippitt returns to this point in his later Chapters, where he tries to show
how the comic can serve as a way of reorienting our sensibilities, and thus
playa role in enabling transitions between radically different ways of
understanding ourselves. Before that, in Chs 3 and 4, Lippitt relates
Kierkegaard / Climacus to the tradition of ethical thought that Cavell has
identified as "Moral perfectionism," and which is characterized by a concern for self-transformation or development, especially as this is effected
by the relation of the self to an "exemplar" who suggests higher possibilities. Here Lippitt relates his work to that of James Conant, drawing at first
on a discussion by Conant of Nietzsche for an account of exemplarity but
then providing a highly effective critique of Conant's own readings of the
Postscript. The difference here is that, while Lippitt takes Kierkegaard to be
offering Climacus (a self-proclaimed "humourist") as an exemplar of intellectually rigorous but existentially responsible thinking, Conant has
argued that Kierkegaard intends us to take Climacus as a negative exemplar, to see him as becoming entangled in the very errors he denounces.
This reading has generated some controversy among Kierkegaard scholars;
Lippitt's critique of it here seems to me definitive.
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In Ch 5 Lippitt offers a reading of Climacus' explicit discussions of irony
and humour as they relate to the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres of
existence, before going on in Ch 6 to relate his ideas to Jamie Ferreira's
important discussion of the possibility of transition between the spheres.
Kierkegaard has often been taken as saying that such transitions must be
arbitrary acts of will, criterionless choices. Ferreira has shown that they are
better understood in terms of an imaginative re-envisioning of one's possibilities. Lippitt argues that like the Gestalt shifts and metaphors discussed
by Ferreira, comedy too can be seen as a way in which we are able to see
ourselves in a new light. In Ch 7 he develops the idea that the comic is able
to contribute to "substantial changes of existential orientation that are of
ethical and religious significance" (p119) showing that the "pathos" and
even "terror" that Climacus certainly associates with such transitions are
not incompatible with and even go naturally together with the comic. In
the final Chapters, Lippitt offers rich and stimulating accounts of the ethical significance of irony (with constant reference to Socrates) and of the
religious significance of humour.
Clearly and stylishly written, this book amply succeeds in showing the
importance of the comic for a proper understanding of some of
Kierkegaard's most fundamental philosophical ideas. As well as providing a
very helpful commentary on important sections of the Postscript, it suggests
ways in which we should read Kierkgaard's other works with more attention to their comic aspects. And it stands in its own right as a significant
enquiry into the neglected subject of the ethical significance of the comic.
Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion is the latest in a series of collections, based
on Conferences on the Philosophy of Religion held at Claremont Graduate
University. D.Z. Phillips, in his introduction, mentions that there was some
surprise at the pairing of Kant and Kierkegaard, the one supposedly an arch
rationalist and moralist in religious matters, the other a proponent of belief in
paradox, "the absurd" and the "teleological suspension of the ethical." A
number of the contributions to this volume argue that one or both of these
characterizations is really a caricature; that (in line with Lippitt's claims)
Kierkegaard is by no means the wild irrationalist that some have supposed,
and that Kant should not be seen as simply attempting to reduce religion to
morality. Thus, as well as considering the contrasts between the two
thinkers, contributors are able to point out significant commonalities. Kant
and Kierkegaard can be seen as repudiating, on the one hand the skeptical
empiricism of Hume and on the other the speculative metaphysical theology
of either Leibniz or Hegel. Both are concerned to relate religion to "practical
reason", to the sphere of the ethical, without intending this as a reduction of
religion to ethics or to a non-realist adoption of an attitude. Despite their significant differences, Kant and Kierkegaard can be seen as standing within
the same essential tradition in the philosophy of religion.
Though the contributors share a sense of the fruitfulness of comparing
Kant and Kierkegaard, this volume is marked by plenty of - sometimes radical - disagreement. It is divided into six Parts. In the first Stephen Evans
argues that a modest form of metaphysics is possible and was endorsed by
both Kant and Kierkegaard, while Michael Weston takes a radically antimetaphysical line, attributing this to Kierkegaard (but reading him through
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what I would see as the distorting spectacles provided by James Conant),
while barely mentioning Kant. In Part Two, Jerry Gill and Jamie Ferreira,
agree on seeing Kant and Kierkegaard as both "making room for faith"
without denying reason, but differ on exactly how they do so. In Part Three
R.Z. Friedman and Hilary Bok agree on seeing Kant and Kierkegaard as
sharing a common concern for the place of the individual in their ethics.
Part Four opens with an ingenious dialogue by Ronald Green in which a
reanimated Kant and Kierkegaard meet in Denver Airport in 2027, and
find themselves less far apart than one might have thought on the issue of
the need for a historical faith. Jack Verheyden suggests that Green manages
to bring the two thinkers together only by "over-Kantianising"
Kierkegaard (see p154). In Part Five John Whittaker and Mario von der
Ruhr discuss Eternal Life, agreeing (though without much in the way of
good argument, that I could see) on the rejection of "temporal immortality," while disagreeing on how else and better one could understand the
notion of eternal life. In the final Part, rather than a debate, we have three
different opinions on "Philosophy of Religion After Kant and
Kierkegaard." Stephen Palmquist gives a useful sketch of the post-KK
options; John Hare argues for the attribution of a Divine Command theory
of morality to Kant (while barely mentioning Kierkegaard) and Anselm
Kyongsuk Min suggests ways in which both our philosophers could be
taken up in the contemporary socio-political context. Each Part ends with a
section, contributed by D.Z. Phillips, "Voices in Discussion," based on but
not an exact transcipt of the debates that followed each session.
As one would expect with such an anthology, some of the papers are
better than others, and different readers will find some topics of greater
interest than others. But overall this collection demonstrates the value of
discussing Kant and Kierkegaard together and there is much in it to stimulate anyone interested in either or both philosophers, or in the central questions of the philosophy of religion which they both address. And one
hopes that it may persuade some Kantians to take more interest in
Kierkegaard and some Kierkegaardians to take more interest in Kant. Both
scholarship and contemporary thinking about the Philosophy of Religion
could only benefit.

Utilitarians and Religion, by James E. Crimmins Bristol, England: Thommess
Press, 1998. Pp. x and 502. $84.00 (Cloth) $35.00 (Paper)

ANDREW GUSTAFSON, Bethel College
This book presents a valuable historical selection of the critical writings of
nine utilitarians on religion as well as two very helpful introductory essays
to the topic of utilitarianism and religion.
Noted Bentham scholar James E. Crimmins divides the book into two
parts: religious utilitarians and secular utilitarians. Crimmins provides
very helpful essays at the beginning of each of the two sections, which do a
great deal to help illuminate the different opinions regarding the relation-

